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Abstract
Does self-control require willpower? The question cuts to the heart of a debate about whether
self-control is identical with some psychological process internal to the agents or not.
Noticeably absent from these debates is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological
category of self-control. Here, we present the results of two behavioral studies (N = 296) that
indicate the structure of everyday thinking about self-control. In Study 1, participants rated
the degree to which different strategies to respond to motivational conflict exemplify
self-control. Participants distinguished between intra-psychic and externally-scaffolded
strategies and judged that the former exemplified self-control more than the latter. In Study 2,
participants provided various solutions to manage motivational conflict and rated their
proposals on effectiveness. Participants produced substantially more intra-psychic strategies,
rated them as more effective, and advised them at a higher rate than externally-scaffolded
strategies. Taken together, these results suggest that while people recognize a plurality of
strategies as genuine instances of self-control, purely internal exercises of self-control are
considered more prototypical than their externally-scaffolded counterparts. This implies a
hierarchical structure for the folk psychological category of self-control. The concept
encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes these strategies along a
hierarchical continuum, with purely intra-psychic strategies at the center and scaffolded
strategies in the periphery.
Keywords: self-control; internalism; willpower; weakness of will; folk psychology; attention;
motivation.
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What’s Inside Is All that Counts?
The Contours of Everyday Thinking about Self-Control
Introduction
Self-control consists in the ability to align one’s behavior with one’s commitments in the face
of contrary motivations. Philosophers and cognitive scientists disagree about the kind of
alignment between behavior and commitment that constitutes exercises of self-control. Some
claim that the alignment between behavior and commitment must result from a distinctive
type of mental process, such as willpower or effortful inhibition (Holton, 2009; Sripada,
2020). These process views of self-control state that attempts at aligning behavior with
commitments count as self-control only if they are produced by means of the right
psychological processes. Others claim that any process that succeeds in aligning behavior
with commitments counts as self-control. These results views imply that self-control can be
realized by means of multiple different psychological processes (including effortful control,
automatic processes, and habits), or even entirely realized in appropriately structured
environments which generate the relevant results regardless of the involvement of
intra-cranial psychological functions (Mele, 1987; 2003; Heath & Anderson, 2010; Vierkant,
2014).1
As with many philosophical debates, most positions fall somewhere between these
two extremes. Partisans of results views admit some causal constraints for behavioral
alignment to count as self-control (Mele, 2003), and some process views recognize that
self-control sometimes consists less in the use of a cognitive capacity and more in its skillful
deployment (Levy, 2017). That said, the two theories make vastly different predictions about
the conditions under which people can be rightly said to exercise self-control.
Suppose you have two friends who are trying to quit smoking. After smoking her last
cigarette, one friend throws out all her cigarettes, tells everyone about it to enlist community
support, and makes a pact with her co-workers that if they catch her smoking she will pay
$2.000 dollars. The other friend resorts to using sheer willpower and distracts herself
whenever she sees someone else smoking. She even keeps a pack of cigarettes in her work
desk as a reminder that she’s the master of her own desires. Suppose your two friends have
the same level of success. Who exercises self-control? If both do, does one exercise
self-control to a greater extent?
According to the results view, both individuals exercise self-control equally.
According to the process view, the first individual—the one who throws out her
cigarettes—does not exercise self-control, since an individual exercises self-control only to
the extent to which she resists the temptation with willpower, and willpower consists solely in
intra-cranial psychological processes, not in external constraints on action. In fact, on the
process view, it might seem that the first individual manipulates her environment to
compensate for a perceived lack of self-control.
Noticeably absent from debates about the relative theoretical merits of process and
results views is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological concept of self-control. This
1 The process views / results views labelling was proposed by Sripada (2020).
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is somewhat surprising, as the two views make opposed predictions about the extension of the
folk concept of self-control, as noted above. Additionally, while the results and process views
may seem opposed, the folk concept of self-control might be structured in a way that
reconciles the two. For example, people might have a prototypical concept of self-control,
with different instances of self-controlled behavior considered more basic (in some respect)
relative to other instances.   Moreover, research into the folk concept of self-control is of
theoretical relevance also because folk-psychological constructs sometimes play a role in
fixing the reference of theoretical terms in psychology and some areas of philosophy (Chihara
& Fodor, 1865; Nichols, 2015; Vargas, 2017), and some theorists hold that if a theory of
self-control aligns with the folk view that speaks in favor of the theory (Sripada, 2020; Levy,
2017).
On the practical side, the extension and structure of the folk concept might influence
how people frame opportunities to exercise self-control, and which tactics are available for
them to select and implement. Evidence suggests people who conceive of self-control as
relying on a depletable resource perform more poorly on self-control tasks relative to people
who believe that self-control does not consume a limited resource (Job et al., 2010; Klinger et
al., 2018). People’s conception of self-control could influence strategy selection by
determining which strategies become accessible, thereby impacting performance. Given
self-control’s significance for long-term wellbeing and health outcomes (Moffitt et al., 2011),
it is of great interest to investigate whether the ‘folk’ concept of self-control aligns with
scientific self-control research.
In this paper, we argue that folk psychological thinking about self-control partially
aligns with both opposing views, but sides more closely with process views. Specifically,
while the concept’s extension aligns with results views, the concept turns out to be
prototypically structured, where the prototype aligns with process views. We report the results
of two pre-registered behavioral studies that support these claims. The results suggest that
while people recognize a plurality of strategies as genuine instances of self-control, purely
internal exercises of self-control are more frequently proposed, more easily accessible, and
considered more efficacious and more advisable than their externally-scaffolded counterparts.
This implies a hierarchical structure for the folk psychological category of self-control. The
concept encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes these strategies along a
hierarchical continuum, with fully intra-psychic strategies at the center and fully scaffolded
strategies at the periphery.
Traditional Views of Self-Control
Despite the prevalence of philosophical theorizing about self-control and its importance in
different Western religious traditions, there has been very little work done to understand how
people attribute self-control to others. Typically, discussions of self-control attribution have
investigated the conditions under which people think that a failure of self-control constitutes
weakness of will (Doucet & Turri, 2020; May & Holton, 2012; Mele, 2010; Newman et al.,
2014; Rosas et al., 2018; Sousa & Mauro, 2014). In what follows, we sketch several lines of
evidence that indicate people are pluralists about what kinds of processes and strategies
constitute self-control.
4
Some folk psychological commitments about self-control seem to emphasize results
over process. Externally-supported self-control strategies are those that rely on off-loading the
need to resist temptation to the environment and to other people. These strategies have been
shown to be more effective in increasing student academic success (Duckworth, White, et al.,
2016); reducing high-calorie food consumption (Privitera & Zuraikat, 2014); reducing alcohol
consumption during residential treatment for alcohol use disorder (Soravia et al., 2015),
increasing rates of smoking cessation among habitual smokers attempting to quit (Wagner et
al., 2004), and helping people stay on an exercise program longer (Mazzoni et al., 2019) .
Many 12-Step self-help groups use principles of community support and situation
management to address problems with substance abuse (Donovan et al., 2013). More
generally, strategies involving a selection or alteration of the agent’s situation seem to be more
effective and less costly than those relying on attention, working memory and inhibitory
capacities (Duckworth et al., 2016); goal-attainment success is correlated not with frequently
resisting temptations but with feeling fewer temptations in the first place (Milyavskaya &
Inzlicht, 2017); and people with high trait self-control seem to avoid temptations rather than
resist them (Hofmann et al., 2012). It should be acknowledged that purely intra-psychic
strategies can sometimes be as effective at facilitating goal attainment as externally-supported
strategies (Milyavskaya, Saunders, & Inzlicht, In Press); that some specific situational
strategies can be less effective than some specific intra-psychic strategies (Hennecke &
Bürgler, 2020); and that much research remains to be done to more clearly specify strategy
effectiveness. That said,  recent research indicates that intra-psychic strategies are susceptible
to limitations and seldom used by those with higher trait self-control (Inzlicht & Friese,
2020); and that  the benefits of externally-supported strategies are far-reaching (Duckworth et
al., 2018).
Resisting (and eventually overcoming) bad habits is commonly thought of as a key
function of self-control, and the evidence cited above shows externally-supported strategies
appear to facilitate this. Thus, to the extent that people are sensitive to the positive impact of
these strategies for habit management, we think that they will be likely to view these
strategies as instantiating self-control. This is a reason to consider the folk concept might
align with results views of self-control: these strategies count as instances of self-control
precisely because they lead to successful resistance and habit revision.
That said, while people might exhibit pluralism with respect to what counts as
self-control, they might be biased toward thinking of purely internal exercises of self-control
as more representative of the concept. A reason to suspect this for Western populations in
particular is that intellectual and religious traditions tend to favor process views of
self-control. The well-known charioteer metaphor from Plato’s Phaedrus (253c–254e)
represents the view that self-control is an intrinsic feature of the individual’s soul—the soul’s
rational element forcing its volitional element into alignment in the face of inner conflict.
Moreover, Plato elsewhere reveals more straightforward commitments to a process view. In
Book I of the Laws, the Athenian Stranger chastises his Cretan companion for Crete’s laws
prohibiting the experience of great pleasures on the grounds that manipulating the
environment to preclude the possibility of temptation also precludes developing the ability to
resist temptation:
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…if our citizens grow up without any experience of the keenest pleasures, and if they
are not trained to stand firm when they encounter them, and to refuse to be pushed into
any disgraceful action, their fondness for pleasure will bring them to the same bad end
as those who capitulate to fear. Their slavery will be of a different kind, but it will be
more humiliating: they will become the slaves of those who are able to stand firm
against the onslaughts of pleasure who are past-masters in the art of temptation—utter
scoundrels, sometimes. Spiritually, our citizens will be part slave, part free, and only
in a limited sense will they deserve to be called courageous and free (Laws 635c-d).2
Plato thus acknowledges that we can sometimes deploy strategies to minimize exposure to
temptation, thereby increasing our chances of behaving in accordance with our better
judgment. But in this passage he claims these strategies do not exemplify a self-controlled
character; rather, they compensate for a lack of it.
Process views are also found in the Christian tradition, where virtues require not only
right action but also an appropriate orientation of mind. For example, the virtue of chastity
requires temperance, where this implies that one “make moderate use of bodily members in
accordance with the judgment of reason and the choice of will” (Summa theologiae IIaIIae Q.
151, a. 1). Similarly, Augustine notes that self-control is needed to overcome a recalcitrant
will divided against itself (Confessions VII, 3.5).3
Thus, traditional perspectives emphasize the centrality and efficacy of effortful,
intra-psychic self-control strategies. We therefore suspect that, either because traditional
perspectives reify folk perspectives or because folk concepts reflect traditional theories, it is
plausible that people incorporate the process flavor of these traditional theories. The influence
of the process tradition might lead people to focus on intra-psychic strategies as prototypical
cases, thus making externally-supported strategies less salient and less valued in everyday
practical thinking.
Process views also permeate contemporary discussion, where philosophers and
cognitive scientists argue that genuine self-control necessarily implies expending some
non-trivial amount of mental effort (Holton, 2009; Levy, 2011; Shenhav, 2017) , and reject
considering purely effortless, pre-emptive strategies as instances of self-control (Sripada,
2020). Similar traces of the process view appear in the psychological tradition. William
James, for one, considered that “effort of attention” is “the essential phenomenon of will”
(James, 1890, p. 562) , and an influential psychological theory compared self-control to a
mental muscle that depletes with continued use (Baumeister et al., 1998; Baumeister &
Tierney, 2012).4 The latter theory has received significant media attention, suggesting another
way in which process views may be influencing the folk concept. Conversely, these theories
4 This trend, however, seems to be turning recently, favoring the possibility of effortless,
environmentally-outsourced self-control. For recent reviews, see Amaya (2020) and Inzlicht et al. (2020).
3 An interesting exception to the Western process tradition is Nietzsche, who outlines six different modes of
“combating the vehemence of a drive” including: “avoid[ing] opportunities for gratification of the drive” and
“deliberately giv[ing] oneself over to the wild and unrestrained gratification of a drive in order to generate
disgust with it” (Daybreak 109). Needless to say, Nietzsche recognizes a rich variety of strategies as legitimate
forms of self-control that maps in interesting ways onto contemporary results views of self-control.
2 Plato (1970), tr. Trevor J. Saunders.
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may themselves be influenced by underlying assumptions about the nature of self-control as
an internal trait. Either way, if there are communicating paths from theory to folk psychology,
these would suggest that the folk concept of self-control would tend to consider intra-psychic
exertions of self-control as prototypical instances of the kind.
Overview
In the following pre-registered studies, we tested the following predictions: (1) People will
recognize externally-supported strategies as instances of self-control. (2) People will
recognize intra-psychic strategies as more representative of the concept of self-control. (3)
People’s assessments of the value of externally-supported strategies will not coincide with the
scientific evidence suggesting that externally-supported strategies are better. If anything,
people will consider internal strategies as more effective than external strategies.
Evidence from Study 1 suggests that people recognize both intra-psychic strategies
and externally-scaffolded strategies as genuine exercises of self-control, although not to the
same degree. Study 2 shows that people regard intra-psychic strategies as more effective,
more advisable, and more salient than externally-scaffolded ones. Collectively, these results
suggest that everyday thinking about self-control exhibits a mixture of process and results




To determine sample size, we conducted an a priori power analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.6
(Faul et al., 2007). For a repeated measures ANOVA of five measures used to detect effect
sizes that approximate those found in pilot studies (f = 0.709) with 99% power at a strict
p-value threshold (p < .001), the analysis suggested a sample size of 134 participants. To
account for exclusions, we over-recruited by 10%. 151 participants voluntarily participated in
this study on Prolific Academic (http://prolific.ac) for monetary compensation. 1 participant
failed to pass the predetermined 2-minutes minimum time on the task, and 3 participants
failed an attention check, so data were analyzed with the remaining 147 individuals (Mage=31
years±10.3, rangeage=[18,70], 106 females, 41 males). We analyzed data only after the
required sample size target was met for all studies. De-identified data for all studies are
available at https://osf.io/7ydph/?view_only=3640f4d6fa2b4486a23a3dab30d3c046.
Materials and procedure
Each participant saw an initial Temptation situation:
Temptation: Taylor, Alex, Sam, Lee, and Jamie have a huge test in class
tomorrow on a difficult topic. They all want to do well in class, so they need to
study. But their friends are going out tonight, which should be a lot of fun.
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Then participants saw five vignettes as a within-subjects independent variable that described
the different self-control strategies each character deployed. Vignettes were presented in a
random order.
Inhibition: Taylor is tempted to go out, but she decides to study instead. Suddenly, her
friends send a group text inviting people to come out to the bar. Taylor thinks it would
be a lot of fun to go out now, but she knows deep down that she should study. So she
makes the effort to reply that she won’t be able to go tonight. Although every now and
then she feels tempted to go out, she resists and successfully keeps studying.
Reappraisal: Sam is tempted to go out, but she decides to study instead. Suddenly, her
friends send a group text inviting people to come out to the bar. She knows deep down
that she should study. So instead of thinking about how much fun the bar will be, she
remembers that the place is very loud, so whenever she goes there her ears buzz
annoyingly for a couple of days. Then she looks at the material she’s studying and
thinks ‘This is not so boring after all!’ Every time she feels tempted to go, she does
this. And so she successfully keeps studying.
Attentional Distraction: Lee is tempted to go out. She’s studying in a coffee shop on
campus, and she’s around people who are talking about their fun evening plans. To
distract herself from the conversations and focus on studying, she decides to put in her
headphones and play her study playlist. When her friends send a text message inviting
people to come out to the bar, Lee is so distracted by the music that she doesn’t notice
the message. She keeps studying without interruptions.5
Situation Modification: Alex is tempted to go out, but she activates a new app called
StudyBuddy, which blocks your phone so that you cannot access any of it while you
study. Her friends send a group text inviting people to come out to the bar, but the text
doesn’t reach Alex because her phone is locked by StudyBuddy. Since she doesn’t
know where her friends will be, she cannot go and meet them. Alex successfully keeps
studying without interruptions.
Akrasia: Jamie is tempted to go out, but she decides to study instead. Suddenly, her
friends send a group text inviting people to come out to the bar. Jamie thinks it would
be a lot of fun to go out now, but she knows deep down that she should study.
However, she can’t stop thinking about how much fun it would be to go out tonight, so
she gives up studying, gets ready and leaves for the bar.
5 This strategy could be seen as blurring into situation modification (putting on headphones arguably counts as
modifying one’s environment). We developed Study 2 to be able to distinguish more clearly between each
strategy type. The crucial point here is that both Attentional Distraction and Situation Modification portray
instances of externally-supported strategies, as opposed to Inhibition and Reappraisal, which are purely
intra-psychic.
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Participants then answered five questions about the extent to which the character exerted
effort, controlled her impulses, resisted temptation, displayed willpower, and displayed
self-control. Participants registered their responses in a slider from 0-100 anchored at the
midpoint (0=not at all, 100=entirely). These five questions correspond to different constructs
commonly associated with self-control.
Hypotheses
We hypothesized that (1) there would be a significant difference in participant attributions of
self-control between fully intrapsychic strategies (Inhibition and Reappraisal in this case) and
externally supported strategies (Self-Distraction and Situation Modification in this case); and
that (2) there would be no significant difference in self-control attribution between the two
intrapsychic strategies.
Results
Figure 1 represents participant ratings of self-control dimensions across different strategies.
(For means scores of self-control attributions see Table E1 in the Supplementary Files.)
Figure 1: Attributions of self-control dimensions per strategy type. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals.
The five self-control dimensions (effort, willpower, impulse control, temptation
resistance, and self-control) had strong internal reliability (α=0.898, 95% CI [0.88, 0.91]),
which suggests strong inter-dependence among the different dimensions. An exploratory
factor analysis fitting one dimension using maximum likelihood extraction showed that item
responses for each dimension loaded onto a single factor (see Table 1).6 A chi-square test
indicated that one factor was sufficient to model the dimensions ( 2(5) = 28.3, p < .001). In
6 The optimal number of factors to extract was determined using the nScree function in the nFactors package in
R (Raiche, 2010). The function returns the results of Cattel’s Scree test and the acceleration factor of eigenvalues
for the items. Both are compared to the number of factors extracted by parallel analysis. In this case, all tests
indicated that one factor should be extracted (see Supplementary Files).
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light of these analyses, we computed a global self-control measure by taking the average
score of item responses.
A one-way ANOVA on average self-control attributions found a large effect of
strategy (F(4, 730) = 556.2, p < .001, η2=0.75, 95% CI [0.67, 0.78]). However, this large
effect size was likely due to the large difference between self-control attributions in the
Akrasia condition and in the other conditions. To account for this, we removed all responses
in the Akrasia condition. A one-way ANOVA on average self-control attributions excluding
responses from the Akrasia condition showed a smaller, but still large effect of strategy (F(3,
584) = 38.6, p < .001, η2=0.17, 95% CI [0.11, 0.22]).







Note: No rotation method was used because a single factor was extracted.
Post-hoc comparisons between the strategies (Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons)
showed that strategies grouped into two categories: fully intra-psychic strategies (Inhibition
and Reappraisal) were not significantly different. Similarly, externally-supported strategies
(Self-Distraction and Situation Modification) were not significantly different. However, these
two groups were significantly different from each other (p<.001) (Table 2). This grouping
suggests that intra-psychic strategies and externally-supported strategies are distinguished
from each other, with the former eliciting greater attributions of self-control relative to the
latter.
Table 2: Post Hoc Comparisons between self-control strategies
Comparison
STRATEGIES  STRATEGIES Mean Difference df t p
Inhibition - Reappraisal -0.268 290 -0.20 0.99




14.683 218 7.52 < .001








0.789 289 0.34 0.98
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Note. p-values are corrected for multiple comparisons using Tukey method
Discussion
These results suggest that people group different strategies together according to the
orientation of the  strategy (internal vs. external), and that they recognize both intra-psychic
and externally-supported strategies as forms of self-control. Ratings of self-control for fully
intra-psychic strategies (Inhibition and Reappraisal) strongly correlate, whereas ratings of
self-control for externally-supported strategies (Self-Distraction and Situation Modification)
strongly correlate. Fully intra-psychic strategies receive significantly higher ratings than
externally-supported ones (Figure 1), suggesting that intra-psychic self-control strategies are
conceptualized as more prototypical exercises of self-control.
While Study 1 provides evidence that intra-psychic strategies manifest self-control to
a greater degree, it has some limitations. It does not indicate a preference for intra-psychic
strategies over externally-scaffolded ones. We want to know whether people consider
intra-psychic strategies to be more prototypical also in an evaluative sense, i.e. whether they
consider them to be more efficient or more choice-worthy than externally-scaffolded ones.
And a higher rating of self-control does not necessarily indicate that. Moreover, our results
could be the product of a demand effect. By asking participants to rate individuals in terms of
effort, willpower, and control, we might have biased people toward internalist self-control
strategies. Finally, while intrapsychic strategies have psychological costs,
externally-supported strategies can have costs of other kinds (e.g. financial, reputational) that
we did not measure in this study, and could be more clearly observed in a study that allowed
participants to evaluate a broader set of strategies.
To overcome these limitations, we conducted another study where participants
produced several self-control strategies for managing temptation using open responses. They
also evaluated the effectiveness of the produced strategies and selected a single strategy that




To determine sample size, we ran an a priori power analysis using G*Power. For a
chi-squared test to detect effect sizes approximating those found in pilot studies (w = .4) with
90% power at a strict p-value threshold (p < .001), the analysis suggested 127 participants. To
cover for possible exclusions, we aimed to recruit 140 participants. Because we had additional
research funds, we recruited above this initial threshold. 164 participants voluntarily
participated in this study on Prolific Academic for monetary compensation. 15 participants
met our exclusion criterion (failing to provide self-control strategies three or more times), so
data were analyzed with the remaining 149 individuals (Mage= 32 years±11.9,




We hypothesized that (1) people would more frequently produce intra-psychic relative to
externally-supported self-control strategies. Since prototypical instances are more
immediately salient when employing a prototype concept (Margolis & Laurence, 2019), we
also predicted that (2) internal strategies would be produced earlier than external strategies.
Further, we expected people to (3) rate intra-psychic strategies as more effective, and (4)
advise them more frequently than external strategies.
Materials and procedure
Each participant saw three vignettes describing a character facing a motivational conflict.
Given the known effects of morality on self-control attributions (Rosas et al., 2018; Sousa &
Mauro, 2014) , we varied the moral nature of the agent’s commitment. In the neutral vignette,
someone’s boss is hosting a dinner party for a big client. The character needs to make a good
impression, but the party is in a high-rise apartment building and the character is afraid of
heights. In the moral vignette, a volunteer doctor is working in a remote location. She receives
a patient and begins to feel nauseous at the sight of the patient’s gruesome injury, but she is
the only qualified doctor on staff and needs to finish the operation to insure the patient’s
survival. In the immoral vignette, the character is trying to enter a criminal gang. At a meeting
with the boss, the character is overcome with fear in the presence of the leader’s dogs.
However, she wants to make a good impression to enter the gang. (Pre-registration and
complete materials are available in the supplementary files:
https://osf.io/7ydph/?view_only=3640f4d6fa2b4486a23a3dab30d3c046.)
After each vignette, participants were asked the following question: “What can
[Name] do? Describe 3 different ways in which [Name] could try to exert self-control and
stick to her commitment.” Following these open responses, participants were asked two
additional questions: (1) “For each one of the options you mentioned, how effective is it as a
self-control strategy?” and (2) “What would you advise the character to do?” Participants
answered the first question using a slider from 0-100 anchored at the midpoint (0=extremely
ineffective, 100=extremely effective). Participants answered Question 2 by selecting a single
strategy from among those they had produced. After selecting which strategy to advise,
participants were asked: “Why would you suggest that option rather than the others?” Finally,
to explore the association between willpower and effort on strategy selection and evaluation,
we asked participants to tell us, for each of the strategies produced, how much effort or
willpower is required to implement the strategy, to which they responded using a slider from
0-100 anchored at the midpoint (0=no effort/willpower, 100=maximum effort / all the
available willpower).
Coding open responses
Participant responses were classified along two dimensions:
1. Orientation: If implementing the self-control strategy requires only internal
psychological resources, the strategy was classified as internal (=intra-psychic). If
implementing the strategy requires using features of the agent’s environment, it was
classified as external (=externally-scaffolded). To be maximally conservative with
respect to our hypotheses, we classified strategies as fully intra-psychic only when
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they did not involve any external support for their implementation. If participants
advised characters to give up, the strategy was labelled as Akrasia. If participants
advised a strategy that violated the narrative constraints of the vignette, the strategy
was labelled with X.
2. Strategy type: Strategy type classifications are based on Duckworth et al.’s (2016)
taxonomy. Each strategy could be classified as inhibition, cognitive reappraisal,
attentional, or situational. Attentional strategies were further subdivided in attentional
focus and attentional distraction.
It is important to keep these two dimensions distinct: strategy orientation is about the location
of the resources used to deploy a strategy (internal vs. external), while strategy type is about
the kind of process involved in strategy deployment (e.g. directing one’s attention, changing
one’s cognitive representations, or modifying one’s environment). While situational strategies
are always externally-scaffolded, all other strategy types can be internally or externally
oriented (e.g. I may distract myself by imagining a future vacation, or by playing music
through my headphones).
Independent raters blind to the study’s hypotheses used classification instructions
(available in the Supplemental Material) to sort participant responses. Inter-rater reliability
was strong for both Orientation (91.6% agreement) and Strategy Type (80.9% agreement).
Raters met to autonomously solve discrepancies and produce a unified categorization, which
was then used for the analyses reported below.
To ensure our annotations captured the existing structure of the textual data
participants provided, we compared them to classifications generated by topic modelling
algorithms (see Online Supplemental Materials, section D).  This revealed a convergence
between rater classifications and automatically inferred classifications, suggesting that rater
coding effectively tracks variances in the data and has a very low degree of arbitrariness.
Results
(1) Intra-psychic strategies are more frequently generated than externally-supported
strategies
Across all vignette types, people produced almost three times more internal than
externally-supported strategies. A chi-square test indicated a moderate association between
vignette type and strategy (χ2(1) = 261.78, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.46, 95% CI[0.40, 0.51])
(See Table 3). Internal strategies were more prevalent across all vignette types, though
significantly more so in the moral vignette (χ2(2) = 36.24, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.17, 95%
CI[0.11, 0.22]) (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Proportions of Internal/External orientation in each vignette
Table 3
Strategy type (intra-psychic vs.  externally-supported) per vignette type (immoral, moral, neutral)
Immoral Moral Neutral Total
Intra-psychic 294 341 284 919
Externally-supported 133 67 144 344
(2) Intra-psychic strategies are more salient
While participants produced significantly more internal strategies, we found that participants
tended to produce more external strategies later in each block, with internal strategies
decreasing and external strategies increasing from the first to the third intra-block attempt at
strategy generation. When excluding invalid responses (Akrasia and X), the difference
between block attempts only approached significance (χ2(2) = 3.81, p = .15). However, invalid
answers also increase later in the block (see Figure 3), and when these are included in the
analysis, there is a significant difference in strategy frequency between attempts (χ2(6) =
13.72, p = .033). That said, the effect is small (Cramer’s V = 0.07, 95% CI[0.0, 0.10]) and the
confidence interval includes 0.
(3) Intra-psychic strategies are advised more frequently
People advise internal strategies more than twice as often as external strategies (I = 291, E =
141), and a chi-square test showed a moderate association between advised strategy and
strategy orientation (χ2(1) = 52.08, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.35, 95% CI [0.25, 0.44]).
Additionally, the moral valence of the situation significantly alters the kinds of strategies
people advised. Indeed, in the moral situation, people advised more internal strategies than in
the immoral situation. Also, the number of external strategies increased in the immoral and
neutral situations (Table 4). However, even in these situations, people still advise a
preponderance of internal strategies relative to external strategies, though the associations
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range from strong to weak (in the moral situation: χ2(1) = 45.88, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.57,
95% CI[0.40, 0.73]; in the immoral situation: χ2(1) = 4.05, p=.044, Cramer’s V = 0.17, 95%
CI[0.00, 0.33]; in the neutral situation: χ2(1) = 13.77, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.31, 95%
CI[0.14, 0.47]).
Figure 3: Frequency of internal strategies decreases by order of appearance, whereas
external strategies and invalid answers increase. Invalid answers are those that advise
the character to give up (labelled ‘Akrasia’), or responses that do not make sense in
the context of the vignette (labelled ‘X’).
Table 4
Type of advised strategy (intra-psychic vs. externally-supported) per vignette type
Immoral Moral Neutral Total
Externally-supported 59 31 51 141
Intra-psychic 83 112 96 291
(4) Intra-psychic strategies are rated as significantly more effective
We conducted a t-test to compare mean rating of effectiveness by strategy orientation. We
computed a Welch’s t-test because responses were not normally distributed (W = 0.94, p <
.001) and variance across groups was unequal (f(918, 343) = 0.81, p = 0.02). Further, because
our hypothesis predicted a specific direction of difference in means between the two groups,
we ran a one-tailed t-test to assess whether mean ratings of the effectiveness of intra-psychic
self-control strategies was greater than externally-supported strategies. Results supported this
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hypothesis, though the effect was small and the confidence interval contains 0 (t(563.47) =
-1.78, p = 0.037, d = 0.12, 95% CI[-0.006, 0.24]).
Results from exploratory analyses
Effort and willpower ratings
Results of a two-tailed Welch’s t-test showed that participants considered intra-psychic
strategies to require more effort (M = 74.8, SD = 22.9, n = 919) than externally-supported
strategies (M = 59.8, SD = 27.7, n = 344), with a large effect of strategy orientation on
judgments of effort (t(528.93) = 8.96, p < .001, d = 0.62, 95% CI[0.49, 0.74]). Results of a
two-tailed Welch’s t-test showed that participants also considered intra-psychic strategies to
require more willpower (M = 77.1, SD = 21.5, n = 919) than externally-supported strategies
(M = 61.6, SD = 27.3, n = 344), with a large effect of strategy orientation on judgments of
willpower (t(510.63) = 9.52, p < .001, d = 0.67, 95% CI[0.54, 0.80]).
To assess the relationship between judgments of willpower and effort and ratings of
effectiveness, we fitted linear models of effectiveness on willpower and effort. The model
accounted for 8% of the variance in effectiveness ratings (F(2, 1329) = 57.46, p < .001, R2 =
0.08). Both judgments of willpower (β = 0.15, p < .001) and effort (β = 0.14, p < .001) had
significant partial effects in the model. This indicates that for every unit increase in judgments
of willpower and effort, ratings of effectiveness increased about 6.7 units. While this is a
small effect, it is consistent with the mean differences observed between ratings of
effectiveness for intra-psychic and externally-supported strategies. Intra-psychic strategies are
judged to require more effort and willpower to implement, and yet, despite their higher costs,
strategies requiring effort and willpower are also considered more effective.
Attentional strategies are prevalent among intra-psychic strategies
We classified strategies according to the taxonomy in Duckworth et al. (2016) : Situation
modification, attentional choice, cognitive reappraisal, and inhibition.  We divided attentional
choice into two further categories: self-distraction and attentional focus. Self-distraction
consists in turning attention away from features pertaining to the tempting stimuli and the
self-controlled action, whereas attentional focus consists in maintaining attention on
goal-relevant features.  Attentional distraction was the most common strategy selection, while
cognitive reappraisal was the least common (Table 5).  When attentional strategies (Focus and
Distraction) are combined, the attentional category accounts for nearly half of all strategies
(47%, n=634) (Table 6).
Effects of morality
We found a small but significant association between the vignette’s moral valence and
strategy orientation. Intra-psychic strategies were significantly more prevalent in the Moral
than in the Immoral and Neutral vignettes (Figure 2).  Morality also played a role in the
strategy type produced by participants (Table 5). Compared to the other two vignettes, the
Immoral vignette contained fewer attentional strategies: attentional strategies accounted for
56% of the total in the Moral vignette and 54% in the Neutral vignette, but they were only
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40% of the total in the Immoral vignette. Comparing only Moral and Immoral vignettes, while
self-distraction was the most prevalent strategy in both, attentional focus was much more
prevalent in the Moral than in the Immoral vignette.
Table 5
Strategy type (intra-psychic vs. externally-supported) per vignette type (immoral, moral, neutral)
Immoral Moral Neutral Total
Attention-distraction 128 116 149 393
Inhibition 127 101 71 299
Situation modification 94 55 102 251
Attention-focus 45 114 82 241
Reappraisal 33 22 24 79
To better understand the relationship between strategy type and morality, we ran a
multinomial logistic regression to predict the likelihood of strategy selection based on
vignette using the nnet package in R (Venables & Ripley, 2002). Coefficients in the model are
odds ratios that estimate changes in the likelihood of the outcome variable (e.g., Strategy
Category) based on predictors in the model (e.g., Vignette Morality). Our model included
only one nominal predictor variable (Vignette Morality). Unlike ordinary least squares
regression, there is no measure of explained variance (R2) for logistic regression. However,
there are several approximations of R2 associated with logistic regression. We computed the
Nagelkerke modified pseudo-R2, which can be interpreted as a measure of the predictive
strength of the model relative to a model that contains no predictors (i.e., an ‘intercepts-only’
or empty model). The model containing Vignette Morality as a predictor had a pseudo-R2
value of 0.062, and the predictive value of the model was significantly greater than the empty
model (LR 2(8) = 53.3, p < .001).
For interpretation, we exponentiated the coefficients of the model to represent the log
likelihood of changes in Strategy based on Vignette Type. The reference level of the outcome
was set to Inhibition, so each coefficient represents the likelihood of selecting a strategy based
on vignette type relative to the probability of selecting inhibition in that same vignette type
(see Table 6 for summary of model coefficients).
Table 6. Summary of coefficients for multinomial regression model of Strategy Type on
Vignette Morality
Strategy type Immoral Moral Neutral
Situation Modification 0.72(0.16) 0.52(0.20) 1.69(0.19)
Cognitive Reappraisal 0.24(0.24) 0.18(0.30) 0.31(0.31)
Attention Focus 0.37(0.20) 1.12(0.17) 1.33(0.20)
Attention Distraction 1.01(0.15) 1.19(0.16) 2.16(0.18)
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Note. Values are exponentiated odds ratios (log likelihood). Parenthetical values are standard errors of odds
ratios. All coefficients are significant predictors in the model (p < .001) as calculated using a 2-tailed Wald
chi-squared test on standardized log likelihood values. Reference level for strategy type = Inhibition.
The model indicates that participants are less likely to advise cognitive reappraisal
strategies over inhibition across all vignette types (likely driven by the small number of
cognitive reappraisal strategies produced). Participants were more likely to select Inhibition
strategies over Situation Modification strategies in either the Immoral or Moral vignette, but
more likely to select attentional strategies over inhibition in the Moral vignette. Moreover, all
of these coefficients had significant partial effects in the model (all p < .001). Based on these
likelihood estimates, the model predicts a Strategy type for each observation based on
Vignette type. To test model accuracy, we compared model predictions with actual
observations. The model achieved 38.9% accuracy. While this might seem low, note that this
is well above chance performance (5 strategy types = 20% performance at chance) and is
based on a single predictive factor (Vignette Morality). This suggests that the moral valence
of the situation depicted in the vignette plays a significant role in the kind of self-control
strategy selected.
Discussion
Study 2’s results strongly suggest that people tend to generate more intra-psychic strategies to
manage motivational conflicts relative to externally-supported strategies. The wide prevalence
of internal strategies, and the small but significant increase in externally-supported strategies
in later responses, suggests that internal strategies are significantly more salient in practical
thinking about self-control: self-control is strongly associated with intra-psychic processes,
making externally-supported strategies less available when devising solutions for a
self-control conflict.
People also tend to advise intra-psychic strategies more frequently than
externally-supported strategies, and tend to consider the former more effective. This is
evidence that intra-psychic strategies tend to be evaluatively preferred to externally-supported
strategies. The higher advisability and effectiveness of intra-psychic strategies might be a
function of greater accessibility and centrality of such strategies to the concept of self-control.
However, we did not find a large effect, and further experiments are needed to replicate and
possibly qualify this result.
We also found that judgments of willpower needed to implement a strategy and the
effort associated with that strategy predict ratings of strategy effectiveness. Stronger
judgments of willpower and effort are positively associated with ratings of effectiveness. This
aligns with the finding that intra-psychic strategies are advised more frequently than
externally-supported strategies.
In the discussion of Study 1, we suggested that asking participants about the effort and
willpower needed to implement a strategy might bias participants. Specifically, we thought
that by cueing participants to think about the amount of effort and willpower associated with a
strategy, they would tend to generate more intra-psychic strategies since they may be thought
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to require more willpower and effort. In order to mitigate this risk, effort and willpower
questions appeared last in the questionnaire for each vignette, i.e. participants saw them only
after they had provided their strategies and evaluated their advisability and effectiveness. The
presence of these questions did not have the expected biasing effect, since participants tended
to produce more intra-psychic strategies during the first attempt in each vignette (before they
encountered the questions) and fewer intra-psychic strategies in subsequent attempts (after
having encountered the questions at least once).
Although we did not have an explicit hypothesis about this, one may reasonably
expect that strategies considered to require lower amounts of willpower and effort would be
considered more effective and advised more frequently. But we found the opposite:
participants advised strategies that are perceived to be more effortful and require more
willpower to a greater extent, and these strategies were also considered more effective.
Collectively, and corroborating the findings from Study 1, these results suggest that
people have a robust tendency to conceptualize self-control in a prototypical fashion, where
intra-psychic, and particularly attentional, processes are central traits of self-control. This
prototypical structure explains the greater frequency, salience, and evaluative superiority of
intra-psychic strategies. Study 2’s results thus jointly suggest that, while the extension of the
folk concept of self-control is compatible with results views (i.e. externally-supported
strategies are included as genuine methods for exerting self-control), the folk concept
nevertheless exhibits a structure predominantly aligned with process views, since purely
intrapsychic cases are treated as prototypical instances of the concept both descriptively (as
suggested by their availability) and evaluatively (as suggested by effectiveness and
advisability ratings), even despite being considered more psychologically costly (by requiring
greater exertions of effort and willpower).
General Discussion
Together, these studies identify central features of everyday thinking about self-control. We
made two broad predictions: (1) attributions of self-control would exhibit a mixture of results
and process views about self-control; and (2) the structure of the folk concept would coincide
more closely with process views: intra-psychic exercises of self-control would be considered
more prototypical than externally-supported strategies. Our studies support both predictions,
suggesting that the folk concept is prototypically a process view despite also including
elements aligned with results views.
According to these findings, folk thinking about self-control diverges from both
process and results views, reflecting a hybrid of the two views. The boundaries of the concept
coincide with results views, as externally-scaffolded regulatory strategies are considered
genuine instances of self-control. But the structure of the concept coincides with process
views, according a central place to strategies that recruit only intra-psychic processes.
This cuts against the view suggested by some researchers that in everyday thinking
self-control is nothing more than effortful resistance (or what Levy (2017) calls “direct
control”; see Holton’s (2009, p. 127) discussion of effort in relation to strength of will). That
said, this does not settle any conceptual debates about the most perspicuous characterization
of self-control. Folk psychological categories do not necessarily carve nature at its proverbial
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joints, and folk thinking might exhibit systematic error in the kinds of phenomena believed to
be instances of self-control (Sripada, 2017). That said, we do think that folk psychological
categories can often provide parameters for how to fix the referents of terms in our theories
(Vargas, 2017).
In that regard, the folk concept of self-control’s novel structure should be considered
in future theorizing. Distinctions reflected in current accounts of self-control might, and
seemingly do, fail to appropriately capture the ontology of self-regulation (Eisenberg et al.,
2019; Herdova, 2017; Inzlicht et al., 2020), so the situation is ripe for conceptual innovation.
The results here suggest an alternative to traditional conceptual structures, one that
encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes them along a hierarchical
continuum, with fully intra-psychic strategies as central and fully scaffolded strategies at the
periphery. This provides novel inspiration for future reflection, considering that theories
consistent with this structure would have the advantage of agreement with the common-sense
view. That said, even if folk psychology agrees with this conception of self-control, that does
not mean it is correct. The view’s merits and drawbacks should be tested and discussed in
future work on the topic.
Our results indicate multiple directions for future work. First, if it is true that people
tend to prefer more intrapsychic strategies, then this might manifest in people selecting such
strategies to manage real-world motivational conflicts. An important question that follows
from this is whether intrapsychic strategies should in fact be preferred. While the
effectiveness of a strategy depends significantly on various contextual factors and cannot be
judged in the abstract (Bonanno & Burton, 2013), we have earlier mentioned some
preliminary evidence suggesting that externally-scaffolded strategies tend to be more effective
(while also mentioning the limitations of this evidence). In particular, situational strategies
that intervene at earlier stages of the regulatory process (i.e., pre-empting rather than resisting
the feeling of temptation) are the most likely to successfully issue in goal persistence.
Add to this that the tendency to produce attentional strategies reveals a limited
repertoire of regulatory strategies, the over-reliance on which has been associated with greater
risk of psychopathology (Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Lougheed & Hollenstein, 2012). Thus,
there are practical reasons for using behavioral and psychophysiological tools to further assess
the scope of this preference for intrapsychic strategies, as well as whether people display such
preference when facing real-life self-control conflicts.
The interactions between strategy selection and moral valence also merit further
investigation. Exploratory analyses from Study 2 suggest that the motivational conflict’s
moral valence is associated with strategy selection. In a moral context (i.e. a situation where
the agent had morally praiseworthy intentions and sought to perform a morally praiseworthy
action), people produced considerably more attentional focus strategies than in an immoral
context. One possible explanation for this is that in advising certain strategies, people believe
that being aware of the goodness of some activity (when it is considered morally good) is
sufficient for motivating the agent to do the activity. This reflects a kind of motivational
internalism in cases where people have morally praiseworthy intentions (Björklund et al.,
2012). The implication is that selecting an externally-scaffolded strategy for performing good
actions could reveal a moral flaw because it suggests one is unable to be sufficiently
motivated just by appreciating the moral goodness of one’s commitment. For good people,
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goodness should be enough of a motivating factor. When commitments are immoral, however,
focusing on them provides no additional motivational force, so attentional distraction
becomes a more viable alternative. If true, this would explain why morally praiseworthy
commitments are associated with a prevalence of attentional focus strategies for managing
motivational conflicts, while attentional distraction strategies are equally prevalent for
morally bad commitments. Further, if this reflects everyday thinking about self-control, then
the preferential bias toward intrapsychic strategies would be expected when people engage in
moral self-improvement. However, confirmatory evidence is needed to support this proposal,
since evidence so far is only exploratory.
Future studies should move beyond the limitations of the present research. As the
relationship between morality and strategy selection shows, situational factors can alter how
people think about self-control. Thus, beliefs about different strategies might be
context-sensitive, raising issues about generalizability. To assess the robustness of judgments
about self-control dimensions and self-control attributions, the relationships between
strategies and situations should be systematically investigated.  In Study 2, all the vignettes
presented the agent already immersed in a situation and close to the moment of action. This
could have biased the strategies suggested by participants. In future work vignettes should
manipulate the framing of the vignette, to capture different stages of the regulatory process in
which the agent finds herself, and examine whether this has an effect on strategy production
and evaluation. Additionally, some studies have found that people tend to select
early-disengagement strategies like distraction to regulate high-intensity stimuli, and tend
towards late-engagement strategies like reappraisal to regulate low-intensity stimuli (Murphy
& Young, 2018; Sheppes et al., 2014). Since all Study 2 vignettes involved high-intensity
stimuli, this could explain the prevalence of distraction and the low levels of reappraisal as
suggested strategies. Thus, future studies should include more varied vignettes to further
corroborate that the patterns reported here are generalizable.
Notably, these limitations might indicate a context-sensitive element in everyday
thinking about self-control. If the framing of vignettes influences deliberation about
self-control strategies, then perhaps the kinds of strategies deployed are a function of how the
situation is framed. Several factors might explain this. One is that some self-control strategies
rely on the use of imaginative faculties such as episodic simulation and counterfactual
thinking (Schacter et al., 2012; Watkins, 2008). In some cases, reliance on imagination is
straightforward: cognitive reappraisal, for example, consists in imaginatively reframing one’s
perception of a tempting stimuli. In other cases, imagination contributes more indirectly.
Situational modification strategies, for instance, rely on understanding how to reorganize
one’s environment to pre-empt the experience of temptation altogether, which requires
imagining how to recombine environmental elements and simulating the effectiveness of this
recombination. Some situation framings might make certain possibilities more remote,
thereby making it more difficult to imaginatively engage these scenarios. Different ways of
framing the same situation (or varying the temporal scale of presenting the situation) might
induce different strategies or make certain possibilities more salient. The preference for
intrapsychic strategies might, then, be reduced or even overcome with a little nudging that
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